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Abstract
The one-way Faraday-Michelson system is a very useful practical quantum cryptography system
where Faraday mirrors(FMs) play an important role. In this paper we analyze the security of
this system against imperfect FMs. We consider the security loophole caused by the imperfect
FMs in Alice’s and Bob’s security zones. Then we implement a passive Faraday mirror attack in
this system. By changing the values of the imperfection parameters of Alice’s FMs, we calculate
the quantum bit error rate between Alice and Bob induced by Eve and the probability that Eve
obtains outcomes successfully. It is shown that the imperfection of one of Alice’s two FMs makes
the system sensitive to the attack. At last we give a modified key rate as a function of the Faraday
mirror imperfections. The security analysis indicates that both Alice’s and Bob’s imperfect FMs
can compromise the secure key.
∗ Electronic address: gaoming.zhengzhou@gmail.com
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is one of the most realistic applications in quan-
tum information. It can generate secure keys between two distant parties, commonly known
as Alice and Bob. The unconditional security has been proven even when an eavesdropper,
Eve, has unlimited computation power permitted by quantum mechanics [3–6]. However,
in practical QKD systems there are always some imperfections that will leave loopholes for
Eve to take use of. Therefore, various hacking attacks based on the imperfections of prac-
tical QKD systems are proposed [7]. There are Trojan horse attack [8], fake state attack
[9], phase-remapping attack [10], time-shifted attack [11] and blinding attack[12]. Passive
Faraday-mirror attack based on the imperfection of Faraday-mirrors in the two-way systems
was proposed in 2011 [13].
Since in two-way system, such as plug-and-play system [14], Alice admits pulses from
other zones in, it is vulnerable to a Trojan horse attack by Eve. Thus one-way QKD system
has an obvious advantage in security over two-way system. In 2005, a novel one-way Faraday-
Michelson quantum cryptography (FMQC) system [15] was proposed. The simple diagram
of FMQC system with Eve is shown in Fig. 1. It is an intrinsically stable QKD system free
of fiber birefringence, which makes it an important and useful practical QKD system. In
Alice’s zone, a laser pulse is split into two pulses by coupler CA. One is transmitted on the
short arm (denoted as time mode a), and the other is transmitted on the long arm (denoted
as time mode b). There is a phase modulator PMA which modulates the phase of the pulse
transmitted on the long arm. The pulses are coupled by coupler CA and transmitted to
Bob. After arriving at coupler CB, the pulses are split into two groups and reflected back
by two Faraday mirrors, respectively. The group transmitted on the long arm is modulated
by phase modulator PMB.
In this system four Faraday mirrors are used to compensate for any birefringence effect in
fibers automatically and perfectly. A perfect FM is a combination of a 45◦ Faraday rotator
and a reflecting mirror whose Jones matrix is given by FM =

 0 −1
−1 0

. Thus after
a state goes through a FM, the polarization becomes orthogonal to that of the incoming
state. The FM can automatically compensate for any birefringence effect in fibers. For
example, when a photon passes through a birefringent medium forward and is reflected by
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FIG. 1. The simple diagram of the FMQC system and Eve’s attack. ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4 are rotation angle
errors of FM1, FM2, FM3, FM4, respectively. Laser, pulse laser diode; ATT, attenuator; DL,
delay line; CIR, circulator; DA, Alice’s detector to monitor possible Trojan-horse photons; Source,
Eve’s light source to send photons to Bob; SPD, single-photon detector; other abbreviations defined
in text.
a FM backward. The matrices can be written as
T (∓θ) =

 cos(θ) ±sin(θ)
∓sin(θ) cos(θ)



 e
iϕo 0
0 eiϕe



 cos(θ) ∓sin(θ)
±sin(θ) cos(θ)

 , (1)
where ϕo and ϕe are the propagation phases of ordinary and extraordinary rays, and θ is
the rotation angle between the reference basis and the eigenmode basis of the birefringent
medium. The overall Jones matrix for a round trip is given by
T (−θ)× FM × T (θ) = ei(ϕo+ϕe)FM, (2)
which shows clearly that a perfect FM can compensate for any birefringence effect in fibers.
In this paper, we study the security of FMQC system against imperfect Faraday mirrors.
We calculate the changed signal states caused by two imperfect FMs in Alice’s security zone.
Then a passive Faraday-mirror(PFM) attack is implemented in this system. By changing
the values of the imperfection parameters of Alice’s FMs, we calculate the quantum bit error
rate induced by Eve and the probability that Eve obtains outcomes successfully. We can
conclude that the imperfection of the FM on the path where there is a phase modulator
makes the system sensitive to the attack. Since PFM attack is just an individual attack
based on intercept-resend attack, it is not optimal. Thus at last we do a security analysis
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taking the imperfections of FMs in both Alice’s and Bob’s security zones into account. A
modified key rate as a function of the Faraday mirror imperfections is given and the analysis
indicates that both Alice’s and Bob’s imperfect FMs can compromise the secure key.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II we introduce the imperfection of FMs and
the resulting loophole. In Sec. III we simulate a PFM attack which can distinguish four
states sent by Alice based on her imperfect FMs. In Sec. IV we analyze the security of
the system against both Alice’s and Bob’s imperfect FMs and simulate the key rate taking
the Faraday mirror imperfections as parameters. Finally, a brief conclusion of this paper is
present in Sec. V.
II. SECURITY LOOPHOLES INDUCED BY IMPERFECT FARADAY-MIRRORS
In above discussion, the angle of Faraday rotator is thought to be exactly 45◦. But
in fact, the angle always has an error ε and the Jones matrix of a practical FM is given
by FM(ε) = −

 sin(2ε) cos(2ε)
cos(2ε) − sin(2ε)

. Generally speaking, the maximal rotation angle
error tolerance is 1◦. When FMs are imperfect, the birefringence effect of fibers cannot be
compensated totally and additional QBER will be induced. What’s worse, the imperfection
of Alice’s FMs will leave a loophole for Eve to obtain more information about the secure
key.
For multi-photon pulses, Eve can take a photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [16–18]
where she maintains one photon to measure and lets other photons pass through. Here we
only consider the single-photon case. Simply and without losing generality, assume that
the incoming state is the horizontal polarization state, i.e, |ψin〉 = [1 0]T . Then the Jones
vectors of the output polarization states for the two time modes are given by
|ψa〉 = −

 sin(2ε1) cos(2ε1)
cos(2ε1) − sin(2ε1)

 |ψin〉 = −

 sin(2ε1)
cos(2ε1)

 ,
|ψb〉 = −

 e
ikδa 0
0 1



 sin(2ε2) cos(2ε2)
cos(2ε2) − sin(2ε2)



 e
ikδa 0
0 1

 |ψin〉
= −

 sin(2ε2)e
2ikδa
cos(2ε2)e
ikδa

 ,
(3)
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where k = 0, 1, 2, 3, and |ψa〉, |ψb〉 are the Jones vectors of time mode a and b, respectively.
δa is the phase modulated by the phase modulator and ε1, ε2 are the rotation angle errors
of FM1 and FM2, respectively. When the FMs are imperfect, the states sent by Alice are
not the standard BB84 states, |ψk〉 = (|a〉 + eikδa |b〉)/
√
2, where δa = pi/2. The four new
states are given by
|Φk〉 = [sin(2ε1)|Ha〉+ cos(2ε1)|V a〉 + sin(2ε2)ei2kδa |Hb〉+ cos(2ε2)eikδa |V b〉]/
√
2. (4)
We can see that the four new states are in three-dimensional Hilbert space. To show it more
clearly, we let |H〉 = cos(2ε1)|X〉+ sin(2ε1)|Y 〉 and |V 〉 = −sin(2ε1)|X〉+ cos(2ε1)|Y 〉, and
denote |Xb〉 = |x1〉, |Y b〉 = |x2〉, |Y a〉 = |x3〉. Then the four new states can be rewritten as
|Φk〉 = {[sin(2ε2) cos(2ε1)ei2kδa − sin(2ε1) cos(2ε2)eikδa ]|x1〉
+[sin(2ε2) sin(2ε1)e
i2kδa + cos(2ε2) cos(2ε1)e
ikδa ]|x2〉+ |x3〉}/
√
2, (5)
which is quite different from Eq. (9) of Ref. [13]. The dimension of Hilbert space of the
states sent by Alice is 3 instead of 2, which will give Eve more information about the secure
key.
By calculating the inner products between any two of the four states we can describe
them in three-dimensional Hilbert space as shown in Fig. 2. The inner products between
any two of the four states are given by
〈Φk|Φk+1〉 = 1
2
[cos2(2ε2)− i cos2(2ε2)], k = 0, 1, 2, 3,
〈Φ0|Φ2〉 = 〈Φ1|Φ3〉 = sin2(2ε2).
(6)
We find that all the inner products only relate to ε2 which means ε1 doesn’t compromise
the security of the system. This is easy to understand because ε2 is the angle error of FM2
on the path where the pulse is encoded and ε1 is the angle error of FM1 on the path where
the pulse is just reference pulse. We can also conclude that only ε3 will open a loophole in
Bob’s security zone from the symmetry between Alice and Bob.
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FIG. 2. The distribution of the four states in three-dimensional space. Θ1 is the angle between
|Φ0〉 and |Φ2〉 and Θ2 is the angle between |Φ1〉 and |Φ3〉. |Φ0〉 and |Φ2〉 are in the bisector plane
of the angle between |Φ1〉 and |Φ3〉. In the same way, |Φ1〉 and |Φ3〉 are in the bisector plane of the
angle between |Φ2〉 and |Φ4〉.
III. PASSIVE FARADAY-MIRROR ATTACK BASED ON ALICE’S IMPERFECT
FARADAY-MIRRORS
A. Passive Faraday-mirror attack based on an intercept-resend attack
Since the states sent by Alice are in three-dimensional Hilbert space due to her imperfect
FMs, Eve can use the operators belonging to three-dimensional Hilbert space to measure
them. Eve can make the following attack: she intercepts each pulse from Alice’s zone
and measures it with five POVM operators {Fvac, F0, F1, F2, F3} which satisfy the condition
that Fvac +
∑3
k=0 Fk = I, where I is identity matrix. When Eve obtains the outcome
corresponding to Fk she resends a standard BB84 state |ψk〉 = (|a〉+ eikδa|b〉)/
√
2. Here the
POVM operator Fvac corresponds to a vacuum state.
In general, the main object of Eve is to find a set of POVM operators that can minimize
the quantum bit error rate between Alice and Bob induced by her attack [10]. Thus Eve
can use this specific strategy to minimize the QBER: let ρk = |Φk〉〈Φk|, ρ =
∑3
k=0 ρk,
Lk =
1
2
ρk+1 + ρk+2 +
1
2
ρk+3, Fk = rρ
−1/2|Ek〉〈Ek|ρ−1/2, where |Ek〉 is the eigenvector of
matrix ρ−1/2Lkρ
−1/2 corresponding to the minimal nonzero eigenvalue and r is the maximal
real number ensuring that the matrix Fvac = I−
∑3
k=0 Fk is positive. Here, we use five POVM
operators to distinguish all the four states sent by Alice instead of only distinguishing two
states {Φ0,Φ3} in Ref. [13]. The PFM attack proposed in Ref. [13] is combined with the
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phase-remapping attack which can make δa ∈ [0, pi/2] and when δa 6= pi/2 only F0 and F3
can be used to minimize the QBER. But in our attack δa can only be pi/2, thus we can use
F0, F1, F2 and F3 to distinguish all the four states sent by Alice and minimize the QBER
simultaneously.
We only focus on two main parameters: the quantum bit error rate, QBER, between
Alice and Bob induced by Eve’s attack, and the probability that Eve obtains an outcome
corresponding to Fk successfully, Psucc. They are defined as follow:
QBER =
∑3
k=0 Tr(FkLk)∑3
k=0 Tr(Fkρ)
, (7)
Psucc =
1
4
3∑
k=0
Tr(Fkρ). (8)
B. Simulation
Since the system is one-way, δa = pi/2. As the maximal rotation angle error tolerance is
1◦, we let ε1 and ε2 both change from −1◦ to 1◦. The results are shown in Fig. 3. From
Fig. 3 (a), we can see that the QBER is almost constant no matter how ε1 or ε2 changes.
In fact, the QBER changes with ε1 or ε2 slightly and the difference is so small that we can
ignore it. As for Psucc, Fig. 3 (b) shows how Psucc changes with ε1 and ε2. We can conclude
that Psucc depends on ε2 alone. From Fig. 3 (c) we can see that when ε2 is given, Psucc is
almost constant however ε1 changes and Fig. 3 (d) shows that the bigger the absolute value
of ε2 is (which means the angle error of FM2 is bigger), the bigger the Psucc is. This can be
easily explained by the results of inner products between Alice’s four states in Sec II. When
|ε2| gets bigger, each 〈Φk|Φk+1〉 gets smaller which means the differences between the four
states are bigger. Therefore, Psucc gets bigger as |ε2| gets bigger.
Moreover, ε2 can’t be 0
◦ because if ε2 = 0
◦, the density operator ρ becomes
ρ = 2


sin2(2ε1) − sin(2ε1) cos(2ε1) 0
− sin(2ε1) cos(2ε1) cos2(2ε1) 0
0 0 1

 . (9)
Then we can find that its rank is 2 which means the dimension of the Hilbert space becomes
2 instead of 3, thus the PFM attack is not effective.
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FIG. 3. (a) The relationship between QBER and ε1, ε2. Note that, QBER is almost constant. (b)
The relationship between Psucc and ε1, ε2. (c) The relationship between Psucc and ε1 when ε2 = 1
◦.
Note that, when ε2 is given, Psucc is almost constant and changes very slightly with ε1. (d) The
relationship between Psucc and ε2 when ε1 = 1
◦. Note that, the bigger the absolute value of ε2 is,
the bigger Psucc is. The special point that ε2 = 0
◦ is not considered in our simulation.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AGAINST IMPERFECTIONSOF FARADAY-MIRRORS
A. Security analysis against four imperfect Faraday-mirrors
In this FMQC system, there are two FMs in Alice’ and Bob’s zones, respectively. If Eve
is the manufacturer of Alice’s and Bob’s instruments, she can set the rotation angle errors
of the four FMs before providing the instruments to them. Thus we want to know whether
Eve can take use of these four imperfect FMs to obtain more information about the secure
key without the legitimate users’ awareness.
Firstly, assume that all the FMs in the system are perfect and Alice sends the horizontal
polarization state. When there’ s no Eve and the quantum channel is noiseless, the pulses
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that pass through (Sa, Lb) and (La, Sb) are |ψSa,Lb〉 = eikδb

 1
0

 and |ψLa,Sb〉 = eikδa

 1
0


when they arrive at CB, respectively. Sa, La, Sb, Lb are denoted as the short and long arm
of Alice’s and Bob’s zone, respectively.
Then if the four FMs are imperfect and Eve knows their rotation angle errors are ε1,
ε2, ε3 and ε4, respectively. Also when Alice sends the horizontal polarization state and the
quantum channel is noiseless, the pulses that pass through (Sa, Lb) and (La, Sb) become
|ψ′Sa,Lb〉 =

 e
i2kδbsin(2ε1)sin(2ε3) + e
ikδbcos(2ε1)cos(2ε3)
eikδbsin(2ε1)cos(2ε3)− cos(2ε1)sin(2ε3)

 ,
|ψ′La,Sb〉 =

 e
i2kδasin(2ε2)sin(2ε4) + e
ikδacos(2ε2)cos(2ε4)
ei2kδasin(2ε2)cos(2ε4)− eikδacos(2ε2)sin(2ε4)

 ,
(10)
when they arrive at CB, respectively. If Eve doesn’t want Alice and Bob to know the change
of the states, she must control the rotation angle errors of the four FMs to always satisfy
|ψ′Sa,Lb〉 = |ψSa,Lb〉,
|ψ′La,Sb〉 = |ψLa,Sb〉.
(11)
Then we can find a solution to Eq. (11),
sin(2ε1) = e
−ikδbsin(2ε3), cos(2ε1) = cos(2ε3),
sin(2ε2) = e
−ikδasin(2ε4), cos(2ε2) = cos(2ε4).
(12)
Since the value of k varies from {0,1,2,3} constantly and randomly when the system is
running, Eve cannot set ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4 to always satisfy Eq. (12). Alice and Bob must be able
to perceive the change of states. Thus Eve can’t take use of four imperfect FMs to obtain
more information about the secure key without the Alice’s and Bob’s awareness.
B. Security analysis of phase-encoded BB84 protocol against imperfect Faraday-
mirrors
The PFM attack in the previous section is an individual attack based on intercept-resend
attack, thus it is not necessarily the optimal attack. Besides, since the minimal QBER
induced is about 14.64% which is just the tolerable upper bound of error rate in individual
attack, it is not realizable in this system. What legal parties want is to make their protocol
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secure against any attack permitted by quantum mechanics. Thus we need to perform a
compact security analysis.
In FMQC system, to implement a phase-encoded BB84 protocol, Alice encodes the signals
in the X basis when she chooses the phase ϕA ∈ {0, pi} and in the Y basis when she chooses
ϕA ∈ {pi/2, 3pi/2}. Bob decodes the signals in the same way as Alice does. In our scheme,
the error rate δX and the fraction qX of nonvacuum events are estimated when both Alice
and Bob choose the X basis. The error rate δph and fraction qY of nonvacuum events are
estimated when both Alice and Bob choose the Y basis. The error rate δY and fraction
qph are estimated when Alice chooses the X basis and Bob chooses the Y basis. The final
secure key is only extracted from the data measured when Alice and Bob both choose the
X basis. When Alice’s and Bob’s FMs are imperfect, the states prepared by Alice will be
different from the standard BB84 states as shown in the above section and the bases chosen
by Bob will also be different from the perfect X , Y basis. Thus the secure key rate will be
compromised.
Here we follow the security proof proposed in Ref. [19]. We assume that the channel is
symmetric which means qX = qY = qph = q and ignore the imperfections of detectors. Then
the key rate in an infinite length limit is given by
RX ≥ 1− h(δph)− h(δX), (13)
where δph = min{12 , δY + 8∆q [(1 − ∆q )(1 − 2δY ) +
√
∆
q
(1− ∆
q
)δY (1− δY )]}, and ∆ = 12 [1 −
F (ρX , ρY )]. F (ρX , ρY ) ≡ Tr(√ρXρY√ρX) 12 is the fidelity which characterizes the basis
dependence of the source.
Since we can conclude that ε1 and ε4 will not compromise the security of the system, we
let ε1 = ε4 = 0 when simulating the key rate. In Eq. (13), ∆ is related to ε2 and nonzero ε3
can increase δX and δY . Thus the imperfections of Alice’s and Bob’s FMs have influences
on the final key rate.
We define ρX =
1
2
(|Φ0〉〈Φ0| + |Φ2〉〈Φ2|), ρY = 12(|Φ1〉〈Φ1| + |Φ3〉〈Φ3|), δX = δ + δX,ε3,
δY = δ + δY,ε3, where δ is the inherent error rate and δX,ε3 , δY,ε3 are the error rates induced
by ε3 in the X and Y bases, respectively. When ε3 6= 0, the bases used by Bob are not
10
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FIG. 4. In both plots, the blue, green, red lines are plotted with q = 0.5 and δ = 5.5%, 6%, 6.5%,
respectively. (a) The relationship between key rate and ε2. We ignore the influence of ε3 which
means δX = δY = δ. (b) The relationship between key rate and ε3. We ignore the influence of ε2
(ε2 = 0).
standard X , Y basis and they are given by
|Φ′k〉 =
1√
2


sin(2ε3)
e
ikpi
2 cos(2ε3)
1

 , (14)
where k = 0, 1, 2, 3. Then the error rates induced by ε3 are given by
δX,ε3 =
1
2
(〈Φ2|Φ′0〉〈Φ
′
0|Φ2〉+ 〈Φ0|Φ
′
2〉〈Φ
′
2|Φ0〉),
δY,ε3 =
1
2
(〈Φ3|Φ′1〉〈Φ
′
1|Φ3〉+ 〈Φ1|Φ
′
3〉〈Φ
′
3|Φ1〉).
(15)
Fig. 4 (a) and (b) show how ε2 and ε3 compromise the final secure key rate, respectively.
To show the effect of ε2 and ε3 more clearly, we let both of them change from −5◦ to 5◦.
From Fig. 4 (a) we can see that the key rate varies significantly as ε2 changes and the effect
on key rate gets more significant as δ gets smaller. Fig. 4 (b) shows that the key rate varies
very slightly as ε3 changes. We can conclude that the key rate decreases as the absolute
values of ε2, ε3 get bigger and ε2 has a much more remarkable effect on key rate than ε3.
V. CONCLUSION
The one-way Faraday-Michelson quantum cryptography system is a very useful practical
system where FMs are used to compensate for the birefringence of fiber. However, practical
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FMs are always imperfect which means the angle of Faraday rotator is not exactly 45◦.
We analyze the security of the system taking Alice’s and Bob’s imperfect Faraday mirrors
into account. Passive Faraday-mirror attack is proposed in two-way system. We consider
this attack in this one-way FMQC system. By changing the values of the imperfection
parameters of Alice’s FMs, we calculate the quantum bit error rate between Alice and Bob
induced by Eve’s attack and the probability that Eve obtains outcomes successfully. Using
simulation we find that only the imperfect FM on the path where the encoded signal pulse
is transmitted can give Eve more information of the secure key and the other FM in Alice’s
security zone has nothing to do with the attack. In our attack, Eve can use five POVM
operators belonging to three-dimensional Hilbert space to distinguish all the four states sent
by Alice. Since PFM attack is just an individual attack based on intercept-resend attack
and the minimal QBER is about 14.64% which is just the tolerable upper bound of error
rate in individual attack, it is neither optimal nor realizable in this QKD system. Then a
modified key rate as a function of the Faraday mirror imperfections is given and it is secure
against any attack permitted by quantum mechanics. The security analysis indicates that
both Alice’s and Bob’s imperfect FMs can compromise the secure key and Alice’s imperfect
FM has a much more remarkable effect on key rate than Bob’s. The imperfection of the
FMs can remind the system’s manufacturer to use as good a FM as possible and the security
analysis can tell legal parties how to adjust privacy amplification to keep a lookout for a
potential eavesdropper.
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